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THE CONTROVERSIAL TRANSITION
PROCESS FROM INVESTIGATING THE
PRESIDENT TO IMPEACHING HIM
CHARLES TIEFER *
I. INTRODUCTION
Proceeding from investigation to impeachment of President
Clinton marked a major development in national legal affairs,
particularly by establishing precedents and procedures for the
future. 1 During the preceding decade, the process of specially in-
vestigating the President, from Iran-Contra through Whitewa-
ter, took on a life of its own.2 During that time, the newly inten-
sified combination of parallel investigations of the President by
Congressional committees and independent counsels reshaped
national legal affairs by producing a new political-legal status:
the "specially investigated President."3 In 1998, that new status
advanced further, by the transition from investigating the Presi-
dent to impeaching him. That transition warrants its own
analysis.
The goal of this article is not to factually assess the allegations
against the President, or the appropriateness vel non of im-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. Solicitor and
Deputy General Counsel for the House of Representatives, 1984-1995. B.A., Columbia
University, 1974; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1977. The author would like to thank Lori
Sherwood and Elinor Walker for their research assistance; and Emily R. Greenberg and
her skilled staff for their library-computer assistance.
1 See Boucher: History Will Recall the Process, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Oct.
6, 1998 at A3 (noting that the current impeachment process will serve as basis for future
impeachment analysis).
2 See Judge Griffin B. Bell, et al., A Roundtable Discussion on the Independent Coun-
sel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REV. 457, 467 (1998) (noting that Whitewater investigation
harkens back to matters prior to Clinton presidency); Jack Maskell, The Independent
Counsel Law, 45 FED. L. 28, 32 (1998) (discussing post-Iran-Contra investigation, Con-
gress allowed independent counsel statute to lapse and did not reauthorize until 1994
when new counsel was appointed to investigate Whitewater).
3 Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE
143 (1998).
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peachment on its merits. Rather, this article focuses on the le-
gal-political 4 precedents and procedures of the transition to the
impeachment process itself.5 This article analyzes the transition
process from the polar viewpoints of idealized proponents of im-
peachment, and defenders of Presidents. 6
The process from investigation to impeachment consists of
three basic elements. First, an investigation of the President
reaches investigative closure, that is, the investigation reaches
interim completion with a view toward supporting impeachment
of the President. In the instant process, Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr reached the point of investigative closure insofar
as he concluded that President Clinton had committed perjury
and obstruction of justice in the Lewinsky matter for which to
recommend impeachment. 7 The Independent Counsel statute
contains a provision that the Independent Counsel "shall advise"
the House of Representatives of any "substantial and credible
evidence" which may constitute grounds for impeachment of the
President. 8
4 See Robert Dudley, Law, Politics, and Impeachment, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 5, 1998, at
62 (reviewing interaction of legal and political theories of impeachment).
5 See Peter Baker & Susan Schmidt, Starr Submits Report to House; Counsel Cites
'Substantial and Credible Evidence of Impeachable Acts, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1998, at
Al (addressing Starr's submission of his report to House of Representatives and its im-
pact on White House); Letter by Starr to House Accompanying the Report, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1998, at A4 (reprinting letter by Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr accompa-
nying report and documentation of his investigation to House of Representatives).
6 These two viewpoints are discussed more generally in Tiefer, supra note 3. It
should be understood that what is attributed to these viewpoints only occasionally coin-
cides with the actual statements and justifications of Presidential accusers and defend-
ers. On either side, the actual statements are more closely rooted in the particular facts
and politics of the Iran-Contra, Whitewater, Lewinsky, or other dispute than in abstract
theories applicable to any possible dispute. To make an analogy, if this were an article
about celebrity criminal trials, what would be attributed to the viewpoints of accusers
and defenders would be abstract and generalizable, and only occasionally coincide with
what was said by those accusing or defending any particular defendant (e.g., 0. J. Simp-
son).
7 See THE STARR REPORT, Parts VI-XI, Sept. 9, 1998. Independent Counsel Starr con-
cluded that there is "substantial and credible" information that President Clinton lied
under oath, obstructed justice, and abused his authority in a manner inconsistent with
the President's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws, which he supported by
eleven possible grounds for impeachment. Id.
8 See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994) (hereinafter "the Independent Counsel statute"). For
discussion of the Independent Counsel statute, see also David E. Rovella, Standard for
Impeachment Report is Untested, NATL L. J., Aug 31, 1998, at A10 (noting absence of le-
gal standard for "substantial and credible" evidence in context of grounds for impeach-
ment); Stephen M. Ryan & Catherine Newcombe, The Power of Independent Counsel Re-
ferrals for Impeachment, 44 FED. LAW 30, 30 (1997) (arguing "substantial and credible"
standard has no point of origin in criminal law and inappropriate grounds for referral of
president for impeachment).
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Second, transfer occurs, in which the Independent Counsel
presents his evidence, and, optionally, a set of charging conclu-
sions, to the House of Representatives. 9 In this instance, the
House received Starr's report and evidence and, through the
House Judiciary Committee, swiftly decided to publicize the key
videotape of the President's questioning as the decisive action
toward the third element. 10 Third and finally, impeachment con-
sideration formally begins, with the House's adoption of a Reso-
lution of Inquiry on the recommendation of the House Judiciary
Committee. 11
This article will analyze these three basic sequential elements
of the transition process from the two polar viewpoints of "accus-
ers" and "defenders." Each of three Parts will start with a brief
description of the procedural steps in the proceedings on the
Lewinsky matter, followed by examples of how the two polar
viewpoints might argue about those steps. From the viewpoint
of the President's accusers, most of whom favor impeachment,
together the three elements amount to the necessary unfolding,
of a procedure anticipated by the Constitution's Impeachment
9 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988) (indicating Congress has no control
over investigation of executive branch and can only receive reports); Philip B. Heymann,
Four Unresolved Questions About the Responsibilities of an Independent Counsel, 86 GEO.
L.J. 2119, 2128-2130 (1998) (noting Independent Counsel reporting requirement under
28 U.S.C. 595(c) and specifically enumerating requirements); Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson
III & Hon. T.S. Ellis III, The Independent Counsel Process: Is it Broken and How Should
it be Fixed?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1570 (1997) (noting that Congress has not
normally overreacted to independent counsel investigations as evidenced by Iran-
Contra). See generally H.R. CONF. REP. No. 103-511 (1994) (containing legislative his-
tory of Congressional reauthorization of Independent Counsel statute).
10 See Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-Up Under Oath: Impeach-
able Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 260 (1998) (arguing that President Clinton's actions
do not rise to level of impeachable offense); David Rogers & Jackie Calmes, Starr Report:
The Fallout- Public View Will Determine President Clinton's Survival, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14, 1998, at A14 (reporting public release of Kenneth Starr's report to House of Repre-
sentatives and noting public reaction); Edward Walsh & Juliet Eilperin, Impeachment
Report Contends Clinton Lied, Obstructed Justice; Vote Begins a Process in House, WASH.
POST, Sept. 11, 1998 at Al (reporting intended release of Starr report).
11 See H. RES. 581 (1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 105-795, at 1 (1998) (authorizing
and directing House Judiciary Committee to investigate whether sufficient grounds exist
for House of Representatives to exercise power to impeach President Clinton); 144
CONGR. REC H10015-02 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Rep. Hyde) (debating
whether to adopt inquiry resolution authorizing House Judiciary Committee to investi-
gate potential for impeachment); Gerald F. Seib & John Harwood, Unprecedented: Some
GOP Heavies Flinch at the Prospect of Clinton's Resigning- Many Fear Lasting Damage
to the Office, But Others Think America Can Cope- We'l do it to You Too', WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 21, 1998, at Al (quoting Alexander Haig)(arguing that if precedent of unhappy
Congress forcing president out is set, Congress has become too powerful body).
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Clause. 12 The Independent Counsel and the House, led as neces-
sary by its majority party, must go through the constitutional
process to determine whether the President committed "high
crimes and misdemeanors." 13 Given the President's ability to
commit offenses and then cover them up, the accusers believed
the process must move swiftly and resolutely forward and pres-
ent the case to the public and formalize the inquiry, lest the
President be seen as "above the law." 14
By contrast, from the viewpoint of presidential defenders, alle-
gations of this kind about the President should be resolved
through public debate and censure of the President, if neces-
sary.15 These steps followed years of serious displacement of
democratic processes by excessive partisan "special investiga-
tion." 16 This transition process, left unchecked, far too readily
12 See U.S. CONST., Art. II, sec. 4. For relevant analyses of impeachment of Presi-
dents, in addition to sources already cited in this article, see, e.g., RAOUL BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, 193-213 (1973) (providing genealogical
analysis of adequate impeachment grounds); IRVING BRANT, IMPEACHMENT: TRIALS AND
ERRORS (1972); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS, 25-32 (1996) (discussing House impeach-
ment process); P. HOFFER & N. HALL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA: 1635-1805, 165 (1984)(providing historical analysis of adequate grounds for impeachment); Michael J. Ger-
hardt, Rediscovering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44
DuKE L. J. 231, 269-75 (1994) (noting nonjusticiability of presidential impeachment); Mi-
chael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its Alternatives, 68
TEX. L. REV. 1, 16-25 (1989) (articulating historical analysis of impeachment procedure
and commenting on inherent problems); William H. Rehnquist, The Impeachment Clause:
A Wild Card in the Constitution, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 903, 917-918 (1991) (explaining role
of constitutional impeachment clauses as related to separation of powers); Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, An Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY L. J.
707, 732 (1988) (explaining nonjusticiable nature of presidential impeachment).
13 See U.S. CONST., Art. II, § 4. See also Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors:
The Clinton- Gore Scandals and the Question of Impeachment, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 1,
20-51 (1997) (describing allegations of impeachable offenses); Julie O'Sullivan, The Inter-
action Between Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 88 GEO. L. J. 2193,
2196-2227 (1998) (providing comprehensive analysis of impeachment power); Jason J.
Vincente, Impeachment: A Constitutional Primer, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 117, 124-125(1998) (interpreting Framer's intent in drafting impeachment clause).
14 See John B. Mitchell, Another Chat With the Lady in the Grocery Line: Clinton v.
Jones, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 441, 441 (1998) (noting that no American is beyond reach of
law); Jerome J. Slestack, The Independent Counsel Act Revisited, 86 GEO. L. J. 2011,
2014 (1998) (stating Watergate reflected belief that not even President is above law);
The People's Trust Has Been Betrayed; Excerpts From the House Debate on Resolution to
Impeach President Clinton, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1998, at A32 (quoting House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde who proclaimed real issue was not lying about sex);
see also O'Sullivan, supra note 13, at 2201 (interpreting Framer's intent of ensuring
presidential accountability via Impeachment Clause).
15 See Ruth Marcus, Turning the Tables on the Prosecutor, WASH. POST, Nov. 20,
1998, at Al (indicating large majority of public wants Congress to drop matter quickly).
16 See Wilkinson & Ellis, supra note 9, at 1570 (noting how Whitewater has been
umbrella under which Kenneth Starr has brought his investigation); see also A Roundta-
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and for the wrong reasons broke through the previous taboo in
national life against seeking partisan advantage by threatening
to undo the people's choice, by election, of the President.17
The Conclusion seeks not to approve one viewpoint or the
other, but simply to make a suggestion for refining the transition
process from investigation of the President to impeachment.
That suggestion is to incorporate the Attorney General into the
process by which an independent counsel's (or other prosecutor's)
investigation makes the transition from investigation to im-
peachment. An Attorney General could give such recommenda-
tions of impeachment a needed stage of legal review in a demo-
cratically accountable way, without providing the Attorney
General absolute control to unduly protect a President.
II. INVESTIGATIVE CLOSURE: STARR'S CHARGES
In 1997-98, the sexual harassment suit against the President,
Jones v. Clinton,18 proceeded through discovery pursuant to the
Supreme Court's remand order.19 Jones' lawyers deposed Presi-
dent Clinton and elicited his denial that he had had a sexual re-
ble Discussion on the Independent Counsel Statute, 49 MERCER L. REV. 457, 467 (1998)
(discussing how Whitewater investigation relates to matters prior to Clinton's presi-
dency).
17 See Abner J. Mikva, Congress Should Approach Impeachment With Respect for the
People's Choice, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 7, 1998, at 23. For a discussion of current literature
on how formal Presidential powers and burdens affect the President's ability to accom-
plish the goals for which he is elected, see also Michael A. Fitts, The Paradox of Power in
the Modern State: Why a Unitary, Centralized Presidency May Not Exhibit Effective or
Legitimate Leadership, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 827, 835 (1996) (discussing how formal Presi-
dential powers and burdens affect President's ability to accomplish his goals).
18 520 U.S. 681 (1997). For discussions of the immunity issue in the Jones case, see
Akhil R. Amar & Nel K. Katyal, Commentary, Executive Privilege and Immunities: The
Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 702-716 (1995) (providing comprehen-
sive analysis of presidential immunity); R. Brent Walton, We're No Angels: Paula Corbin-
Jones v. William Jefferson Clinton, 71 TUL. L. REV. 897, 973-74 (1997) (focusing on politi-
cal aspect of impeachment because of President's political, rather than legal accountabil-
ity for wrongdoing); Bradford E. Biegon, Note, Presidential Immunity in Civil Actions: An
Analysis Based upon Text, History and Blackstone's Commentaries, 82 VA. L. REV. 677,
696-712 (1996) (explaining evolution of presidential); William F. Allen, Note, President
Clinton's Claim of Temporary Immunity: Constitutionalism in the Air, 11 J. L. & POL.
555, 557-560 (1995) (analyzing Clinton's claim of immunity in suit filed against him by
Paula Jones).
19 See Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Paula Jones Endgame, LEGAL TIMES, June 2, 1997, at
25. The author suggests that the Supreme Court left a number of key issues for the Dis-
trict Court to address on remand. Id. On remand, Judge Susan Weber Wright denied in
part and granted in part Clinton's motion to dismiss. Jones v. Clinton, 974 F.Supp. 712,
730 (E.D. Ark. 1997).
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lationship with former White House intern, Monica Lewinsky.20
Simultaneously, Independent Counsel Starr was told by Linda
Tripp, a partisan Republican posing as Lewinsky's friend, that
the President was concealing such a relationship. Independent
Counsel Starr determined this concealment was done in ways
that constituted obstruction of justice and, once Clinton had de-
nied it, perjury as well.21 The Independent Counsel statute ne-
cessitated that Starr obtain an expansion order before he would
have jurisdiction to investigate the matter. 22 Starr asked Attor-
ney General Janet Reno to apply for one based on Tripp's tapes
of Lewinsky; Reno complied and an expansion order was issued
by the special judicial panel for Independent Counsel matters. 23
This immediately became public and a media firestorm ensued
over the charges against the President. 24
During early 1998, President Clinton made efforts to limit the
damage to his public image by continued focus on his efforts to
conduct presidential duties. He succeeded in maintaining his
public approval rating, although he also worsened his position by
continuing denials of the Lewinsky relationship. 25 The Inde-
20 See James Bennett, The President; Clinton Marks a 'Vindication' With a Guitar,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1998, at Al (reporting denial of sexual relationship by President
Clinton with Monica Lewinsky in deposition in Paula Jones suit); Testing of a President;
Excerpts From Deposition Given by Clinton in January, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 1998, at
A15 (containing excerpts from Clinton deposition).
21 See Francis X. Clines & Jeff Gerth, The President Under Fire; The Overview; Sub-
poenas Sent as Clinton Denies Reports of an Affair with Aide at White House, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1998, at Al (reporting Starr's obtaining evidence of possible perjury and obstruc-
tion of justice by President Clinton); Mark Mueller, Scandal Rocks Clinton: Congress Can
Impeach if Evidence Supports Allegations, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 23, 1998, at 4 (citing
experts who felt perjury and obstruction of justice would meet constitutional impeach-
ment standards).
22 Expansion occurs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 593(c). Expansion is discussed in Tiefer,
supra note 3. For an elaboration on Kenneth Starr's allegations as reported to Congress,
see also Daniel H. Politt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-Up Under Oath: Impeachment
Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 260 (1998) (alleging perjury and obstruction of justice).
23 See Roberto Suro, Jordan Was Justification to Widen Starr Probe, WASH. POST,
Jan. 28, 1998, at A22 (noting the approval of Attorney General Reno and judicial panel
with regard to expansion of Starr investigation); The President Under Fire; Excerpts
From Reno Request on Expansion of Whitewater Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998
(highlighting Janet Reno's comments to special judicial panel with regard to expansion of
Independent Counsel's jurisdiction).
24 See Richard L. Berke, Republicans See Jones Case as Double-Edged Sword, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, at S1 (analyzing extensive media coverage of Lewinsky scandal).
25 See Alison Mitchell, On Impeachment Process, GOP Leaders Consider Timing and
Bipartisanship, N.Y. TIMES, March 30, 1998, at Al (discussing increasing approval rating
of President Clinton); see also John M. Broder, Two White House Aides Appear Before
Starr's Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, at Al (stating President Clinton's deni-
als); John M. Broder, Monica Lewinsky's Mother Fails in Bid to End Testimony, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 1998, at Al (referring to President's denial of all allegations concerning
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pendent Counsel pressed his inquiry, successfully obtaining judi-
cial rulings overcoming invocations by White House lawyers of
executive and attorney-client privilege, 26 and by the Secret
Service of its own privilege. 27 Ultimately, the Independent Coun-
sel obtained Lewinsky's testimony and physical evidence by a
grant of transactional immunity.28
During the spring of 1998, Starr repeatedly but unsuccessfully
sought to question the President by negotiated request. 29 Ulti-
mately, Starr served him with a grand jury subpoena, and Presi-
dent Clinton submitted to videotaped questioning in the White
House by Starr's prosecutors, on August 17.30 That evening, on
national television, the President acknowledged that in the past
he had an inappropriate relationship with Lewinsky.3 1 This did
not slow the movement toward impeachment. 32 His testimony
sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky); Francis X. Clines, Jones Lawyers Issue Files
Alleging Clinton Pattern of Harassment of Women, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1998, at A6
(referring to Clinton's express denials of impropriety).
26 See In re Bruce R. Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 148 F.3d 1100, 1100 (D.C. Cir.
1998), cert. denied Office of the President v. Independent Counsel, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998)
(rejecting claims of executive privilege); see also John M. Broder & Don Van Natta, Ex-
ecutive Privilege Invoked in Clinton Aides' Testimony, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1998, at A2
(discussing President's invocation of executive privilege); Glenn R. Simpson, Executive
Privilege Claim Could Shield Meetings of Clinton and Lawyers, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29,
1998, at A20 (examining President's use of executive privilege).
27 See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, Rubin v.
U.S. 119 S. Ct. 461 (1998) (denying immunity to Presidential Secret Service); see also
Phil Kuntz, Agency is Divided Over Starr's Bid to Question White House Guards, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 13, 1998, at A16 (stating two possible theories of privilege).
28 See Robert L. Jackson, Team Lewinsky Tells Art of the Deal Inquiry: Lawyers De-
tail Secret Meetings With Starr that Led Quickly to Immunity, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998,
at Al (detailing negotiations surrounding Lewinsky immunity); see also Richard A. Ser-
rano, Law Allows for Two Kinds of Immunity, L.A. TIMES, July 29, 1998, at All (ex-
plaining transactional immunity): Glenn R. Simpson & David S. Cloud, Starr Reaches
Agreement: Negotiations Continue on Clinton Appearance, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1998, at
A16 (discussing testimony to be offered in exchange for immunity).
29 See John M. Broder, Clinton Refuses to Discuss Independent Counsel's Request
that he Testify Before Grand Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at Al (demonstrating
President's refusal to comply with Independent Counsel's requests); William Neikirk,
Hill Democrats Feel Clinton Must Testify, CHI. TRIB., July 28, 1998, at A10 (indicating
points of debate on whether President should comply with Independent Counsel's re-
quest).
30 See Eric M. Freedman, Precedent and Practice Would Not Let Him Ignore Starr's
Subpoena, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 3, 1998, at 21 (discussing President Clinton's decision to
testify); Glenn R. Simpson & David S. Cloud, Clinton Plans to Testify on Lewinsky, WALL
ST. J., July 30, 1998, at A20 (reporting President's agreement to testify).
31 See ATLANTA J. & CONST., Aug. 18, 1998, at A01 (discussing political impressions
and possible implications of Clinton's admissions).
32 See Karen Foerstel, Clinton's Address Fails to Defuse Ticking Time Bomb of Starr
Report, CONG. Q. WEEK. REP., Aug. 22, 1998, at 2277 (putting forth that impeachment
viable option); Richard L. Berke, Scathing and Sad, Democrats React to Clinton Speech,
CONG. Q. WEEK. REP., Aug. 19, 1998, at 1 (arguing that admitting disputed actions still
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that day, nonpublic because of the grand jury secrecy rule, com-
bined admissions on his part of the Lewinsky relationship, with
the denial that he had lied in his Jones deposition, thus subject-
ing himself to allegations not only for what had occurred previ-
ously but also for alleged lack of truth in his August 17th testi-
mony as well.33 Starr concluded that the President had
committed perjury and obstruction of justice warranting im-
peachment; 34 hence this stage may be termed investigative clo-
sure.
A. Impeachers'Perspective
From the impeachers' perspective, this stage amounted to the
necessary commencement, for a President who commits a grave
crime, of the process anticipated by the Independent Counsel
statute and the Constitution's Impeachment Clause. With an or-
der in hand expanding his jurisdiction to cover the crime, the In-
dependent Counsel had the responsibility to investigate and
make meritorious charges.35 Judicial orders overruling the
privilege claims of witnesses such as presidential advisers and
the Secret Service vindicated the Independent Counsel's quest.36
The President himself had to be questioned, both as to communi-
cations and actions where he was among the only witnesses, and
also as to matters touching on his state of mind during his al-
leged crimes - for example, why he thought his testimony in the
civil deposition not to be perjurious. To refrain from investigat-
ing, questioning, and charging him would place him "above the
law."
From this perspective, it was the President, not the Independ-
ent Counsel, who had chosen to prolong the matter and to
heighten the legal stakes, by misleading the nation and the
grand jury through public and private denial of a sexual rela-
tionship and months of other dragged-out proceedings in place of
a simple early confession. 37 Once the Independent Counsel de-
fails to end political scandal).
33 See Excerpts from White House Response to Starr Report, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12,
1998 at Si 1 (voicing President's denial of involvement in criminal conduct).
34 See Excerpts: The Starr Report, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Sept. 12, 1998, at B1 (de-
tailing Independent Counsel's findings).
35 See Suro, supra note 23 at A22 (discussing implications of special judicial panel).
36 See Simpson, supra note 26 (highlighting use of presidential executive privilege).
37 See Jonathan Turley, Clinton's Nullification Strategy of Last Resort, NAT'L L.J.,
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cides that he has strong evidence of alleged perjury by the Presi-
dent,38 he must choose among a limited array of options. There
is a substantial body of opinion suggesting that the Independent
Counsel could not indict and try the President while he is in of-
fice. 3 9 Only a recommendation of impeachment to the House
would avoid placing the President "above the law." The Presi-
dent's wrongful methods of resistance, such as the claims of
privilege and the circulation of denials by statements to aides,
obstructed Starr's investigation and thus warranted their own
charges.
B. Presidential Defenders' Perspective
From the "Presidential defense" viewpoint, Starr's investiga-
tive and conclusion-drawing steps aggravated the already seri-
ous displacement of democratic processes by excessive and parti-
san investigation. 40 For four years, Starr overinflated and
overextended an initial mandate to look into the Arkansas land
deal of Whitewater, blowing it up into his apparent mission to
take down the President. 4 1 By working with Tripp and indirectly
with the lawyers for Paula Jones, Starr had himself created and
criminalized a matter that other prosecutors might well not have
considered worthy of such treatment, namely, a married person's
predictable unwillingness to confess adultery. Starr's pursuit of
the matter as though it were a serious threat to the nation when
July 20, 1998, at A22 (arguing against presidential strategy).
38 See Deirdre Shesgreen, Perjury's The Strong Count. Or is It?, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
21, 1998, at 16 (evaluating evidence concerning perjury charge).
39 See Hon. J. Harvie Wilkinson, III & Hon. T.S. Ellis, III, The Independent Counsel
Process: Is it Broken and How Should it Be Fixed?, 54 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1515, 1597
(1997) (arguing that sitting presidents cannot be indicted); see also Harvey Berkman &
Marcia Coyle, Can a Sitting President Be Indicted?, NAT'L L.J., June 22, 1998, at Al
(proffering that indictment is not available with respect to sitting president); Barry Jef-
frey Stern, Revealing Misconduct by Public Official Through Grand Jury Reports, 136 U.
PA. L. REV. 73, 110-111 (1987) (advising against indictment where impeachment is avail-
able).
40 See Naftali Bendavid, Starr 'Made a Mockery' of Law, Laments Senator Sponsor,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 9, 1998, at 7 (putting forth Democrat's proposition that Starr investiga-
tion was contrary to purposes of independent counsel process); Excerpts From White
House Response to Starr Report, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1998, at Sll (illustrating executive
attitude towards extensive independent counsel investigation); Albert R. Hunt, Levin
Details Starr's Abuse of Power, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 1998, at A19 (listing and enumerating
Senator Levin's allegations of Starr's alleged abuses of power).
41 See Alan C. Miller & Judy Pasternak, Starr's Office let Tripp Give Details to Jones
Lawyers, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at Al (trying to reconstruct evidence surrounding
issues of perjury).
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it was not,42 overlooked that the President's actions occurred
during a mere civil case on an issue not material to that case,
simply as an effort not to be set up by ideological opponents to
make a case of his private life. 43 The President's resistance fit
into the pattern of legitimate resistance, spanning the previous
decade, by three successive Presidents who all attempted to im-
pose upon them the status of "specially investigated President,"
rather than amounting to felonious abuse of power. 44
If it were not for the overzealous use of the machinery for con-
ducting special investigations, this alleged scandal would have
been sorted out by political debate and, if warranted, criticism
and even opprobrium in the press, Congress, and other channels
of commentary. A sense of proportion by the public would have
left it there. 45 Starr could have skipped the active role of trying
to push President Clinton out of office; his resort to the hitherto
taboo tactic of impeachment fostered by ideological opponents of
the President to try pushing him from office, represented Starr's
own misjudgment from which a more neutral figure would have
shied away.46
42 See Robert F. Drinan & Wayne Owens, An Easy Line to Draw, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
1998, at 31 (describing Starr's intense pursuit of evidence to support charges against
President Clinton).
43 See Marcia Coyle & Harvey Berhman, Will He Escape This Time?, NAT'L L. J.,
Feb. 9, 1998, at Al (evaluating merits of Starr's charges); David E. Rovella, Will He Es-
cape This Time? Perjury Charge a Stretch, Say Nation's DAs, NAT'L L. J., Feb. 9, 1998, at
Al (arguing President Clinton is attempting to avoid spectacle made of his life).
44 See Karen Alexander, Abuse of Power: The Weak Link, LEGAL TIMES, Sept, 21,
1998, at 16. All three recent Presidents in that status, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and
Clinton, sought to keep the operation of the Washington scandal machinery, from preoc-
cupying public life. This was to allow the President to continue his own efforts to fulfill
his constitutional duty and focus on substantive national issues and needs.
Clinton's public and private self-defense, his invocations of privileges, and his negotia-
tions over the terms of Presidential testimony, amounted to legitimately vigorous defense
of the Presidential office. Starr's efforts to criminalize these, by terming them acts of
obstruction in themselves, reflected the inquisitorial nature of the special investigation
machinery. Recall that Independent Counsel Walsh's indictment of former Secretary of
Defense Caspar Weinberger on the eve of the 1992 election elicited a wave of pardons by
President Bush just before he left office. To a zealous prosecutor or Presidential oppo-
nents, what Presidents do, looks like obstruction, to others it does not.
45 Even Independent Counsel Walsh had not gone farther; Walsh presented his re-
sults in the tempered form of a final report closing out his investigation. He had, in
1987-88, a substantial amount of evidence about President Reagan's Iran-contra indiffer-
ence to legal restraint, and, by 1992, quite an amount of negative evidence about Presi-
dent Bush's truthfulness in the efforts to obstruct Iran-contra investigations.
46 He could have made a neutral factual report without recommendations in that re-
gard, leaving the House to take on itself the weight of an unprecedented political chal-
lenge to the President's continuation in office. See Bruce Ackerman, What Ken Starr Ne-
glected to Tell Us, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 1998. Nowhere in Kenneth Starr's report are the
constitutional requirements for impeachment enumerated. Id. at A33.
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III. TRANSFER: THE RECEPTION OF STARR'S CHARGING REPORT
Once the prosecutor decides to take his investigation of the
President to a further step, transfer occurs. 47 Assuming at least
potential receptiveness by the House of Representatives, the
prosecutor takes the steps to furnish the House with evidence,
and, optionally, a set of charging conclusions. 48 Starr needed a
court order to furnish material cloaked with grand jury secrecy 49
to the House for potential, and, as it turned out, actual release.
During Watergate, Independent Counsel Jaworski turned over to
the House evidence regarding President Nixon with an outline
known as the "roadmap." The Jaworski referral preceded the
Independent Counsel statute and presumably shaped the
thoughts of those who wrote the referral provision. Using that
provision to obtain the necessary court order, Starr turned over
to the House an indictment-like report that effectively charged
the President with eleven counts of perjury and obstruction, ac-
companied by the videotaped testimony of the President and ex-
tensive documentation, including much about the sexual rela-
tionship of the President and Lewinsky. 50
In the spring and summer of 1998, as it became generally
known that Starr leaned toward using this provision, the House
majority party led by Speaker Gingrich made preparations to re-
ceive the Starr submission. 5 1 When the referral occurred two
months before the 1998 congressional election, the House
adopted a short-term resolution, House Resolution 525, govern-
ing its processes en route to consideration of a Resolution of In-
47 See 28 U.S.C. § 591(b)(1) (1998) (stating Independent Counsel may conduct inves-
tigations against sitting president).
48 See, e.g. Excerpts: The Starr Report, supra note 34 (detailing findings of Independ-
ent Counsel).
49 See FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 6(e)(2) (indicating that some material discovered in Inde-
pendent Counsel investigation may be shut off from general public via secrecy order).
50 See generally Clines supra note 25, at A6 (referencing specific portions of Presi-
dent Clinton's recorded deposition testimony).
51 See David S. Broder & Susan Schmidt, House Group Would View Starr Evidence,
WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 1998, at Al. Special House funds were made available for the
House Judiciary Committee to hire staff to prepare. Politically, extensive internal
strategizing went into how the House majority party would handle the matter.
Though no statute or other formal authoritative constraint necessitates that only if the
House is receptive can a prosecutor make a referral. However, a prosecutor in an adver-
sary relationship with the President would think twice before making a referral absent
such receptiveness, for an adverse reception would give the President's defenders a de-
finitive edge.
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quiry.52 House Resolution 525 made a fundamental political de-
cision expected to be to the disadvantage of the President. 53
Namely, the resolution anticipated making public the evidence
underlying the Starr report.54 This was implemented by the
House Judiciary Committee's release of the videotape of the
President's questioning session by prosecutors to be nationally
televised. 55
A. Impeachers'Perspective
From the impeacher's perspective, once the Independent
Counsel had concluded that the President had committed perjury
and obstruction, Starr and the House had few choices other than
to proceed with their actions against the President. Anything
short of this would be considered allowing him to be "above the
law." In Watergate, Jaworski only furnished evidence after Con-
gress and the public had had extensive opportunity to under-
stand the possible charges through its proceedings, particularly
the 1973-1974 hearings.56 Accordingly, Jaworski had no need to
report any pointed conclusions, and the 1974 House had no need
to publicize most of Jaworski's evidence. 57 The Constitution and
the Framers' intent make potential impeachment a public mat-
ter, requiring public awareness and public judgment. There had
been no Congressional hearings of any kind on the Lewinsky
matter. Hence, Starr from the impeacher's viewpoint, could
properly decide his role was to furnish Congress and the public
with the benefit of his own investigative insights in the form of
conclusions, 58 and the House could consider its proper role was
52 See H.R. REP. No. 105-703, at 1 (1998); 144 CONG. REC. D956-01 (dailey ed. Sept.
10, 1998) (providing for deliberative review by House Judiciary Committee of communi-
cation from Independent Counsel).
53 See 144 CONG. REc. D956 (explaining review process).
54 See id. (making review process information open to public).
55 See Dan Carney & Jeffrey L. Katz, Panel Votes to Release Clinton Video After
"Vigorously Partisan" Debate, CONG. Q. WEEK. REP., Sept. 19, 1998, at 246 (discussing
House Committee debates on public release of deposition videos).
56 These included the lengthy and thorough hearings by the Senate Watergate
Committee and the initial work of the House Judiciary Committee something of a
framework for understanding evidence about what charges might be made. See generally
HOFFER & HALL, supra note 12, at 170 (examining impeachment process).
57 See generally BERGER, supra note 12, at 195 (providing closer look at history and
constitutionality of impeachment process).
58 See id. Moreover, the nature of the alleged crime in Watergate gave the prosecu-
tors there a large role apart from charging the President, from taking pleas to trying the
President's conspirators. Id. In contrast, the nature of the alleged crime in the Lewinsky
THE CONTROVERSIAL TRANSITION PROCESS
to furnish the public with the vital evidence of the alleged of-
fense.
As for the House's reception, the resolution for release of the
evidence, House Resolution 525, passed with strong bipartisan
support. 59 Subsequent partisanship and Presidential gains in
the poUs 60 said nothing about the continued need to respond to
serious allegations of "high crimes and misdemeanors."
B. Presidential Defenders'Perspective
From the perspective of the President's defenders, the transfer
of the matter to the House, the one-sided Starr report 6' and the
circus-like release of the videotape of the President, 62 under
color of considering impeachment, worked a radical and unwel-
come historic shift in the conduct of national affairs. In 1974,
the Jaworski referral occurred without any such usurpation.63
Further, in 1974 the House majority party leadership attempted
to keep the matter from being, or appearing, partisan. The
avoidance of partisanship is essential to confer legitimacy on the
House in a serious consideration of impeachment. By contrast,
in 1998, in allowing the matter to be and to appear partisan in
strategy and tactics, 64 the House majority party headed by
matter meant that virtually the entirety of the Independent Counsel's role consisted of
the preparation for charging the President: no one else pled and no major trial of charges
seemed imminent. Id.
59 See 144 CONG. REC. H10015-02 (dailey ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Rep Hyde)
(authorizing Judiciary Committee to investigate whether sufficient grounds exist for im-
peachment of William Jefferson Clinton).
60 Shortly after the adoption of House Resolution 525, such bipartisanship ended
with a sharp partisan division in the House Judiciary Committee, but to the President's
accusers simply reflected the forces of partisan loyalty by House Judiciary Democrats, an
ideologically polarized group, rallying around their President. That the President's pub-
lic support ceased eroding at this time did not diminish the seriousness of the allegations
of "high crimes and misdemeanors," but merely showed the tactical skills of the Presi-
dent at the videotaped questioning session.
61 See John M. Broder, Clinton Lawyers Say Starr Distorted Facts in the Report, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at 26 (stating that President's attorney, David E. Kendall, and
White House Counsel, Charles F.C. Ruff have called Starr's report one-sided and ma-
nipulative).
62 See Francis X. Clines, Bitter Struggle Behind Closed Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
1998, at 9 (quoting unnamed Democrats as saying that committee meeting that voted for
release of videotape was mere voyeurism).
63 Special Prosecutor Jaworski submitted evidence, without charges, to an ongoing
impeachment process in the House. Moreover, he did so with the fair expectation, as
turned out, that the House would treat what he submitted as evidence to be studied care-
fully and coolly, in a bipartisan way, behind closed doors, not as the raw material for
public partisan tactics by the opposition party against the President.
64 The limited minority party support for H. Res. 525 did not represent a genuine
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Speaker Gingrich delegitimized their own processes.
The transfer process lacked the elements that would justify so
great an alteration in the status of the duly chosen President,
from merely being specially investigated, to the very real threat
of impeachment, Senate trial, and pressure to leave or to face an
ultimate Senate vote on removal from office. That the Presi-
dent's popular support increased after the release of the video-
taped evidence, and that the public lost patience with the quest
to unseat the President, reflected a sound national antagonism
to the unwelcome innovation of the House majority using im-
peachment for partisan advantage. 65
III. IMPEACHMENT CONSIDERATION: PASSAGE OF THE
RESOLUTION OF INQUIRY
For all the murkiness of the impeachment process, 66 House
procedure has crystallized the step that formally commences
proceedings. In September of 1998, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee moved on after making public the evidence from the In-
dependent Counsel regarding the President. Based on a staff re-
port taking the Starr report's eleven suggested counts of perjury
and obstruction and reformulating them as fifteen, the Commit-
tee reported to the House in favor of a Resolution of Inquiry.
A Resolution of Inquiry chiefly determines whether the major-
ity of the House stands behind a possible report of impeachment
charges. This contrasts with ordinary legislation, which a com-
mittee reports to the floor without the House previously adopting
any particular resolution.67 In effect, the gravity of impeachment
warrants a preliminary House vote before a committee even con-
bipartisan mode of proceeding by the President's accusers, but, rather, the difficulty of
anyone standing, on the eve of election, for something other than full disclosure. Even
so, directly after H. Res. 525's passage, the sharp party divisions in the House unmasked
how differently the majority party proceeded in 1998 than in 1974.
65 See Michael Kranish, Clinton Acting in His Own Defense; Election-style Battle Be-
ing Waged Against Impeachment, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1998, at Al (explaining that
in spite of controversy, Clinton approval ratings are up).
66 See Marcia Coyle & Harvey Berkman, Impeachment: A Murky Realm, NAT'L L.J.
Sept 21, 1998, at Al (proffering that both Congress and defense attorneys are unclear
about particulars of impeachment process); see also Ann Coulter, High Crimes and Mis-
demeanors: The Case Against Bill Clinton, N.Y. L. J., Sept. 4, 1998, at 2 (asking whether
Congress or courts should ultimately resolve issue of impeachment).
67 See Seth Metsch, Tools for Understanding: Problems of Legislative History in En-
vironmental Law, 9 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 181, 186-87 (1997) (explaining that committee
reports go to House floor where bills are amended before formal adoption).
THE CONTROVERSIAL TRANSITION PROCESS
siders the matter. Additionally, a Resolution of Inquiry, by its
terms, shapes the committee inquiry.68
Following up House Resolution 525, the majority party put
forth in the House Judiciary Committee, and then, on the floor, a
proposed resolution that paralleled the 1973 Resolution of In-
quiry regarding President Nixon. That Resolution of Inquiry did
not confine the inquiry to particular subject matters or a par-
ticular duration. The minority party, in opposition, shaped an
alternative that focused attention on the lack of a deadline, re-
flecting the popular desire to get past the Lewinsky matter. 69
After the House defeated that alternative, the final vote to adopt
the Resolution of Inquiry, the last step in the transition process
that this article will analyze, reflected unanimous support
within the majority party, plus the support of 31 Democrats, ap-
proximately one out of seven Democrats.
A. Impeachers'Perspective
From the viewpoint of the President's accusers, the initiation
of impeachment consideration followed a fair and proper proc-
ess. 70 The House observed precedent both in the content of the
Resolution of Inquiry, and in the process of considering it. By
modeling the content of the Resolution of Inquiry on the 1973
one, the House majority threw away every tactical advantage
from manipulative redrafting, in favor of standing by prece-
dent.7 1 In particular, it quietly discarded the internal propos-
68 See T. R. Goldman, House Procedural Vote Will Shape Landscape of Impeachment
Inquiry, LEGAL TIMES, Sept., 28, 1998, at A7. It can confine the inquiry to particular
subject matters or limited time periods. Id. Additionally, it arms the committee with
necessary investigative tools not possessed by standing committees, such as the power to
compel witnesses to submit to staff depositions. Id.
69 See Lizette Alvarez & Eric Schmitt, House Democrats Seek Party Unity on Im-
peachment, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1998, at 1 (explaining Democrats wanted to give inquiry
specific deadline for resolution); Vic Fazio, The Upcoming National Nightmare, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 8, 1998, at 35 (reporting that majority decided to commence proceedings less
than one month before elections).
70 See Paul J. McNulty, Craig is "Rewriting History" on Impeachment Issues, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1998, at 27 (highlighting portions of letter by House Judiciary Commit-
tee's Director of Communications); see also Scott Baesler, Statement by Rep. Scott Baesler
Regarding Impeachment: Inquiry Resolution, Government Press Releases, Oct. 8, 1998
(explaining that Rep. Baesler voted for inquiry because he believes process will be fair).
71 For concessions made to the minority, see Impeachment, CONGRESS DAILY, Oct. 1,
1998 (explaining that House Judiciary Committee modeled inquiry resolution after 1974
Watergate investigation).
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als 72 for a much tougher set of investigative procedures.
Similarly, as to the process of consideration, the House gave
the minority party the opportunity, both in committee and on the
floor, to offer alternatives and to freely debate. 73 The House ma-
jority party could take satisfaction that none of its members
voted against the Resolution of Inquiry, even some members
from pro-Presidential districts. 74 Moreover, it could claim vindi-
cation from the 31 Democratic votes in support, enough to call
the result "bipartisan."75
There may have been few precedents for impeaching the
President, but there were just as few precedents for overlooking
serious allegations of presidential crimes on the level of perjury
and obstruction. That Congress rarely impeaches does not make
a conclusive argument for never impeaching. 76 Furthermore,
adoption of a Resolution of Inquiry, although a grave step,
merely meant going forward with an inquiry. 77 It did not encom-
pass even House impeachment, let alone Senate conviction and
removal from office, unless the inquiry developed a case war-
ranting this. 78 Adopting such a Resolution simply was the proper
thing to do with such serious allegations.
72 See A.B. Stoddard, Hyde Seeks Power to Jail Balky Witnesses, THE HILL, Sept. 9,
1998, at 1 (stating that Rep. Hyde wanted power to jail uncooperative witnesses).
73 For concessions to the minority, see Alison Mitchell, Hyde Bows to Democrats on
Some Inquiry Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1998, at 1. It would be contradictory to blame
it for not moving fast enough, and for moving too fast; the possibility of both criticisms
suggests that it walked a fine line as to timing, giving enough time for debate without
dragging the matter out. Id. See also Jeffrey Taylor, Panel Democrats Try to Set Limits
on Clinton Probe, WALL ST. J. Oct. 2, 1998, at 16. The inquiry resolution is almost en-
tirely drawn from the Nixon inquiry, but needs limits not set in that instance in order to
prevent the Clinton investigation from dragging on. Id. at A16.
74 See Mark Anderson & Jennifer Dooren, US House Impeachment Inquiry, Dow
JONES NEWS SERV. Oct. 8, 1998, at All (explaining that Republicans voted for inquiry,
joined by thirty-one Democrats).
75 See Francis X. Clines, Partisan Rancor: Not Always So Bad for the National Soul,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1998, at 3 (noting that even if number "31" was quibbled about, par-
tisan division does not exonerate President); see also Asa Hutchinson, Congressman Asa
Hutchinson's Floor Statement Regarding the House Vote on Resolution of Inquiry, Gov-
ernment Press releases, 10/8/98 (noting that in bipartisan vote, House voted to initiate
impeachment proceedings).
76 See Robert Scott, Remarks of Congressman Robert Scott Regarding Impeachment
Consideration, Government Press Release, Nov. 11, 1998 (stating that several compara-
tively recent examples of judicial impeachments furnished some precedent, for instance,
"high crimes and misdemeanors" might include non-official conduct like tax evasion).
77 See Huchinson, supra note 75 (urging Congress that vote for resolution is neces-
sary in order to find truth).
78 See U.S. Vote '98: Election May Change Impeachment Dynamic, Dow JONES INT'L
NEWS SERV., Nov. 4, 1998, at 9:00 (indicating that decision on impeachment is uncertain
until last vote is cast).
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B. Presidential Defenders
From the perspective of the presidential defenders, the initia-
tion of impeachment consideration represented a grievous dis-
play of partisanship. 79 In contrast to Watergate, or even Iran-
contra, this was not a matter where White House misconduct
had a largely unknown dimension, necessitating deep and
lengthy further investigation before the House made even pre-
liminary judgments.8 0 The public felt confident it knew the basic
facts of the Lewinsky matter, probably much more than it
wanted to know; what remained was judgment. Accordingly, the
House process should have focused on whether the President's
conduct warranted removal from office. 8 1 House proceedings
should have concerned the issue of what to do with the Presi-
dent, i.e., censure or removal. 82 Members of the House should
have taken heed of the public's strong opposition to removing the
President from office. 83 Indeed a partisan House vote approving
the Resolution of Inquiry laid the groundwork, as, in fact, oc-
curred, for the House majority party to cheapen impeachment by
using it in television advertising for partisan advantage by
making the President's personal life a basis for negative spots
against Members of his party.84
79 See Dan Carney & Jeffrey L. Katz, Panel Votes to Release Clinton Video After
'Vigorously Partisan" Debate, CONG. Q. WEEK. REP., Sept. 19, 1998, at 2467; see also
Martian Frost, Democratic Caucus Chair Martin Frost's Statement on Impeachment,
Censure & Livingston Resignation, GOVERNMENT PRESS RELEASE, Dec. 29, 1998 (arguing
that Republicans are attacking President Clinton in partisan and injudicious manner).
80 See David Lauter, Clinton Job Rating Hits 68%, Best Showing Ever Times Poll,
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, at Al (offering that President's private life should not be public
and does not affect is job).
81 See Excerpts from Comments by Members of the Judiciary Committee, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 6, 1998, at A22 (recounting Representative Zoe Lofgren's illuminating comments -
she worked with counsel regarding impeachment). See generally Marc Lacey & Richard
A. Serrano, Law, Facts Prove Case Against Clinton, Prosecutors Contend at trial,
L.A.TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at Al (proposing that all facts of Lewinsky scandal are known
and all that remains to be seen is whether those facts support removal of President from
office).
82 See Lloyd N. Cutler, James Hamilton, Nicholas B. Katzenbach & Abner J. Mikva,
No Time for Partisans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at 27 (noting that there was great
partisanship in decision to proceed with impeachment hearings).
83 See Richard L. Berke, With 31 Exceptions, A Partisan Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9,
1998, at 21 (suggesting that "bipartisan" Resolution of Inquiry really was not bipartisan).
84 See Congress, Legal Scholars Debate Impeachment Question, CHI. DAILY L. BULL.,
Feb. 7, 1998, at 219. A letter from over 400 scholars, addressed to Speaker Gingrich is
quoted. Id. The authors of the letter stated "members of Congress would violate their
constitutional responsibilities if they sought to impeach and remove the President for
misconduct, even criminal misconduct, that fell short of the high constitutional standard
for impeachment." Id.
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Only twice before had Congress considered presidential im-
peachment. 85 The lack of impeachment proceedings indicates
former Congress' attempt to conform with the intent of the
Framers, and only employ impeachment in situations which both
parties and the public agreed objectively threaten the Constitu-
tion.86 Independent Counsel Starr had previously forfeited public
trust, as reflected in his low poll ratings amid professional criti-
cism. 87 For the House majority party to push ahead in this way
similarly forfeited public trust.88 This injured not just the con-
duct of national affairs for that year and that President, but un-
dermined the Presidency thereafter, by making that office, as it
had never been intended by the Framers and (other than in
1868) had never been rendered in two centuries in practice, vul-
nerable henceforth to a partisanly-driven Congressional opposi-
tion.8 9
IV. A MODEST PROPOSAL: A ROLE FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
This proposal does not seek to argue for broad conclusions
about the merits of impeachment of Presidents in general or the
merits of this impeachment in particular. Rather, it seeks to
85 See Daniel H. Pollitt, Sex in the Oval Office and Cover-up Under Oath: Impeach-
able Offense? 77 N.C. L. REV. 259, 277-279 (1998). Only two other Presidents have been
considered for impeachment, Andrew Johnson, and Richard Nixon. Id. Johnson was ul-
timately acquitted by the Senate, and Nixon formally resigned before the completion of
impeachment proceedings. Id. See also THE IMPEACHMENT REPORT: A GUIDE TO THE
CONGRESSIONAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE CASE OF RICHARD M. NIXON, 1-3, 55-57, 243-244
(U.P.I. & World Almanac eds. 1974).
86 See Peter C. Hoffer, No Case for Clinton's Impeachment, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 9, 1998,
at A19 (stating that Constitution's Framers intended impeachment to reach only offenses
that occur when accused is in office, or are directly related to office); see also Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787, at 66 (Madison's notes) (stating that impeachment is
necessary when President's acts might impact on nation).
87 See Akhil Reed Amar, Disassembling the Impeachment Train, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 28,
1998, at 2 (positing that relationship between Kenneth Starr and Chief Justice
Rehnquist has appearance of impropriety that Framers were seeking to avoid in that
Rehnquist appointed Starr to investigate, and now presides over proceedings); see also
Richard Ben-Veniste, Comparisons Can be Odious, Mr. Starr, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 21, 1998,
at 21 (stating Starr is first Independent Counsel to himself be investigated for possible
illegal conduct).
88 See Michael Tuckett & William Neikirk, GOP Facing its Own Trial, CHI. TRIB.
Dec. 23, 1998, at 1 (noting Republican party received its lowest approval rating in over
one decade due to House impeachment of President Clinton).
89 See O'Sullivan, supra note 13 at 2220 (suggesting that Framers did not intend im-
peachment as device to accomplish partisan political objectives); see also THE FEDERALIST
NO. 65 at 396-397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (noting decision re-
garding impeachment is more likely to depend on partisan politics than evidence as to
guilt or innocence).
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propose a mechanism that will act as another safety check
within the three stages of impeachment already discussed.
The proposal concerns an additional role for the Attorney Gen-
eral. Under current law, the Attorney General plays a key role in
the system of special investigation of the President, by deciding
whether to initiate an Independent Counsel and whether to ex-
pand the Independent Counsel investigation.90 Attorney General
Reno decided in 1994 to initiate a Whitewater Independent
Counsel. In 1998, she agreed to expand his jurisdiction to the
Lewinsky matter.91 An Attorney General can, by contrast, use
her powers to slow down any headlong push toward even more
use of the machinery of "special investigation."92 All through
1997 and 1998, Presidential critics made demands for an Inde-
pendent Counsel on the matter of campaign finance in the 1996
election. 93 Attorney General Reno turned these demands aside,
again and again, even when threatened by the House Committee
on Government Reform and Oversight with contempt of Con-
gress.94
90 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 592(c), 593(c) (1998); see also Jack Maskell, The Independent
Counsel Law, 45-JUL FED. LAW. 28, 32 (1998) (noting that in deciding whether appoint-
ment of Independent Counsel us warranted, Attorney General must conduct review of
initial allegations to determine whether reasonable grounds for further investigation ex-
ist, and then submit findings to three-judge panel of U.S. Court of Appeals); see also
Brett M. Kavanaugh, The President and the Independent Counsel, 86 GEO. L.J. 2133,
2154 (1998) (explaining that current Independent Counsel statute authorizes Attorney
General to define and delineate Independent Counsel jurisdiction).
91 See Bruce Fein, Whitewater, Appointment Untarnished, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 23,
1994, at A21 (detailing how Attorney General Janet Reno appointed Robert Fiske to head
Whitewater investigation, but three-judge panel voted against his reappointment in favor
of Kenneth Starr); Investigating the President, Report of the Independent Counsel to Con-
gress, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 12, 1998, at C3 (stating that Attorney General Reno applied
to expand Kenneth Starr's jurisdiction upon receipt of information from Independent
Counsel office that Monica Lewinsky was prepared to offer false testimony in Paula
Jones investigation).
92 See 28 U.S.C. § 596(b)(2) (1994); see also Niles L. Godes & Ty E. Howard, Inde-
pendent Counsel Investigations, 35 AM. CRIM L. REV. 875, 887 (1998) (noting that Attor-
ney General can request Independent Counsel investigation be terminated on grounds
that all matters have been resolved). See generally John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or
Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General Power, Conduct and Judgment in Relation to the
Work of an Independent Counsel, 49 MERCER L. REV. 519, 529 (1998) (stating that Attor-
ney General has flexibility in approving or denying expansion of inquiry).
93 See Report to Reno May Fuel Debate on Campaign Finance Probe, WASH. POST,
July 23, 1998, at A7 (explaining how Republican members of Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee tried to convince Reno that enough evidence of campaign finance abuses existed to
warrant Independent Counsel to inquire into 1996 Presidential election).
94 See Reno Set to Brief Senators, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 21, 1998, at 4 (stating
that Reno had been threatened with contempt of Congress for refusing to reveal contents
of memo which made argument for reversal of her refusal to appoint special prosecutor to
investigate campaign finance abuses); David Johnston, Lawmaker Seeks Vote on Con-
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Under the current process, when an Independent Counsel con-
siders making a submission to the House of Representatives re-
garding impeachment of the President, the Attorney General has
no role. 95 It is suggested that the unsifted forwarding of Starr's
recommendation to the House of Representatives, where the pro-
cess quickly sank to partisanship, represents the aspect of the
transition process most in need of some kind of improvement.
Those favoring impeachment considered that Starr had solid
evidence of "high crimes and misdemeanors." 96 However, Presi-
dential defenders did not consider the evidence to meet the his-
torically high standard for removing a President. 97 There is a
need for something to separate the many occasions of partisan or
ideological charges against a President from those which might
warrant removal. Historically, the taboo against impeachment
accomplished that separation. What would be the unhappiest
precedent to result would be for the historic restraint on im-
peachment charges to lose its efficacy for sorting out such
charges, without any replacement in sight. That would leave the
prospect of easier resort to impeachment charges without the ex-
pectation anything will come of such charges but partisan ma-
neuver, a cheapening of the impeachment procedure and a coars-
ening of national legal affairs.
In order to preclude the diminution of the historic restraint on
impeachment charges, and yet to allow serious consideration of
meritorious charges, an Independent Counsel (or other prosecu-
tor) making such charges should be obliged first to lay the mat-
ter before the Attorney General. The Attorney General would be
considering the same issue that the Independent Counsel does -
not whether the President is guilty, but merely whether there is
"substantial and credible evidence" to go to the House for consid-
tempt Resolution Against Reno, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1998, at 16 (stating that Rep. Dan
Burton sought vote of full house on contempt of Congress resolution against Janet Reno).
95 See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994); see also Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Interaction Between
Impeachment and the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2195 (1998) (not-
ing that impeachment referral provision is mandatory).
96 See Michael Tackett & Roger Simon, Clinton Attorneys Say Case Too Vague, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at 1 (stating that House managers' trial brief argued that President
subverted Constitution and his office); see also Alan Stone, Common Law Shows us the
Way, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1 (arguing that perjury and obstruction of jus-
tice are within definition of "high crimes and misdemeanors").
97 See Louis Freedberg, Clinton Denies All Charges in Senate Trial, SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON., Jan. 12, 1999, at Al (stating President's lawyer's submitted that charges
brought against Bill Clinton do not constitute high crimes and misdemeanors).
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eration of impeachment. 98 The Attorney General would go
through a process similar to the one she followed with Starr's
(granted) requests for expansion of jurisdiction and with the (de-
nied) requests for application for appointment of an Independent
Counsel on campaign finance. 99
That is, when the Independent Counsel suggested submitting
to Congress a recommendation of impeachment to the Justice
Department, review of the evidence by the career Criminal Divi-
sion of the Justice Department would be expedited. 100 The re-
sults would be further reviewed by the senior officials such as
the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division and the
Deputy Attorney General. Ultimately, the Attorney General
would make her own judgment, either approving a submission to
the House of Representatives, or, reporting her adverse judg-
ment and submitting to hearings regarding that adverse judg-
ment before Congress.
A time limit, such as 30 or 45 days, would govern the Attorney
General's review. More importantly, a further refinement would
be an explicit statutory provision that the Attorney General's de-
cision was not final. As a proper fallback, if the House, by ma-
jority vote, itself called for consideration of impeachment, a court
would properly issue a Rule 6(e) order. Upon its issuance, the
evidence from the Independent Counsel would be furnished to
the House. 10 1 In other words, a determined House could still
work its will in obtaining evidence, as the Impeachment Clause
of the Constitution anticipates, 102 even over Attorney General
opposition. This proposed process would merely interpose a
stage of Justice Department analysis, and allow the Attorney
General to shift the weight of initiation of impeachment from the
Independent Counsel to the House, without preventing a deter-
98 See 28 U.S.C.§ 595(c) (1994).
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 593(c) (1994) (defining procedures for jurisdictional expansion of
Independent Counsel's power); see also United States v. Tucker, 78 F.3d 1313, 1322 (8th
Cir. 1996) (deciding that when Attorney General determines matter warrant further in-
vestigation, jurisdiction must be expanded or new Independent Counsel appointed).
100 See 28 U.S.C. § 594(i) (1994) (allowing Independent Counsel power to appoint his
own, separate investigative team); see also Barrett, supra note 92, at 528 (noting that
Independent Counsel may obtain assistance directly from Department of Justice).
101 See FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 6(e) (setting forth guidelines for disclosure of grand jury
testimony).
102 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl.5 (giving House of Representatives sole power over
impeachment); see also 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994) (mandating Independent Counsel give
full report to House of Representatives).
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mined House from proceeding.
Some may wonder whether this would have any effect, with a
determined House usually, perhaps invariably, overriding any
Attorney General. Alternatively, the proposed process might
have several adverse affects: impeding a proper Independent
Counsel referral, causing delay at critical times, and hurting the
Justice Department's appearance of nonpartisan integrity by
dragging it into an inevitably controversial and often supremely
partisan decision. 103
These counterarguments have much force. However, plausible
alternatives are lacking. A court cannot issue an order to go
from investigation to impeachment. 104 It is a prosecutorial
judgment in a political context, not a judicial one. 105 All things
considered, the placing of decisions on initiating and expanding
independent counsels on the Attorney General has been one of
the better-working aspects of the Independent Counsel stat-
ute. 106 It combines a recognition that the Justice Department
has recovered from the depths of Watergate,107 with giving it a
limited and scrutinized, not absolute or secret, role. The role
suggested here would be fenced with several checks, with an ex-
cessively partisan and Presidential-defending Attorney General
doing neither herself nor the President much good, and an At-
torney General who kept public confidence by her objectivity and
103 See THE FEDERALIST, No. 65, at 407 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that im-
peachment of President will invoke partisanship and animosity); see also Kavanaugh,
supra note 90, at 2148 (noting that Department of Justice has fallen under attack for re-
fusing to investigate Vice President Gore's campaign fund-raising).
104 See 28 U.S.C. § 595(c) (1994); see also Hon. Peter W. Rodino, The Case for the In-
dependent Counsel, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 5, 13-14 (1994) (identifying that judiciary
appoints Independent Counsel and is responsible for reporting any information that sup-
ports impeachment to House of Representatives).
105 See 28 U.S.C. § 595 (c) (1994); see also Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional
Limits to Impeachment and Its Alternatives, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1, 43 (1989) (noting that im-
peachment carries strong political consequences).
106 See 28 U.S.C. § 592(c)(1) (1994) (establishing initiation of Independent Counsel);
see also Sharon Lafruniere, Barr Urges Fundamental Changes' in Independent Counsel
Statute, WASH. PosT, Apr. 8, 1992, at A5 (quoting Rep. Barney Frank as saying he is
"pleased" with process by which Independent Counsel is chosen); but see Ken Gormley,
Starr's Three Silent Chaperones, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at A13 (stating that extending
Kenneth Starr's jurisdiction from Whitewater to Monica Lewinsky has put Independent
Counsel law validity in jeopardy).
107 See Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independent Counsel Provisions: How the
Past Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489, 494 (1998) (noting how credi-
bility of Justice Department was called into question during Watergate); Senator Carl
Levin, The Independent Counsel Statute: A Matter of Public Confidence and Constitu-
tional Balance, 16 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 13 (1987) (noting loss of public trust in Justice
Department during Watergate investigation).
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fairness having the greatest chance of positive effect.
Moreover, an Attorney General might sometimes make a use-
ful compromise step, moderating the excesses of an Independent
Counsel without overplaying her hand and trying to squelch him
altogether. For example, in the Lewinsky matter itself, the At-
torney General might have approved a submission to the House,
but canceled out the most controversial parts of the submission:
the heavy reliance upon sexually explicit aspects ill-suited for
Congressional proceedings; 108 the timing of the referral on the
eve of the 1998 election;10 9 and the sharp recommendations
about impeachment by the Independent Counsel in place, as in
1974, of letting the evidence do the talking. An Attorney Gen-
eral might well seek, not to block the transition from investiga-
tion to impeachment, but to channel it (e.g., by removing the
more incendiary elements, and smoothing the timing, while fo-
cusing on any hard evidence) in ways that benefit all sides. She
might establish some public trust that the process was going
forward predominantly for objective, not anti-President, rea-
sons. 110
In any event, the analysis in this article points less to the in-
exorability of this particular proposal, than to the existence of a
new subject. A new political-legal process exists in national af-
fairs, that reorients the relationship of the branches of govern-
ment, and of the interaction between the system of criminal jus-
tice and the political process. This analysis is not the end, but
the beginning, of trying to understand, and of discussing how to
improve, the process of the controversial transition from investi-
108 See T. R. Goldman, Lessons From the Thomas-Hill Hearings, LEGAL TIMES, Sept.
21, 1998, at 19 (stating that introduction of "inflammatory evidence" only serves to incite
hearing participants); Richard Wolffe, Clinton Fights Back With Rebuttal of Starr
Charges; Explicit Report Accuses US President of Perjury and Obstruction of Justice, FIN.
TIMES (London) Sept. 12, 1998, at Al (noting sexually explicit nature of Kenneth Starr's
report to Congress).
109 See Alison Mitchell, Testing of a President: The Impact; Parties Look to November
in Weighing Starr Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 1998, at 1 (warning that Clinton's prob-
lems could keep disillusioned Democrats from voting in next election, while energizing
Conservatives); see also Alison Mitchell, With Lines Drawn, House Panel Near Impeach-
ment Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1998, at Al (reporting that House vote on impeachment
will be among last acts this Congress takes before midterm election recess).
110 See Bill Press, Starr and Impeachment, Take a Hike; Issues are Welcome, But Old
News of Scandals Just Doesn't Cut it With Voters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at B9 (noting
public distrust of Kenneth Starr); see also Nancy Dunne, Polls Show Clinton Job Rating
Unimpaired, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept. 15, 1998, at As (quoting Walter Burnham, pro-
fessor at University of Texas who proposes that Starr is out to get President Clinton).
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gation to impeachment of the President.
